Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer by Rubinstein, Kevin
NYLS Law Review 
Vols. 22-63 (1976-2019) 
Volume 52 
Issue 4 Corporate Governance Five Years After 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Is There Real Change? 
Article 8 
January 2007 
Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: 
Balancing the Interests of Employee and Employer 
Kevin Rubinstein 
New York Law School Class of 2007 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Law and 
Economics Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the Interests of 
Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637 (2007-2008). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS. 
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-4\NLR401.txt unknown Seq: 3 11-APR-08 13:07
VOLUME 52 | 2007/08
KEVIN RUBINSTEIN
Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 806: Balancing the Interests of
Employee and Employer
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Kevin Rubinstein earned his J.D. from New York Law School in 2007.
637
I. INTRODUCTION
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”)1 was passed in re-
sponse to the spate of corporate scandals and mismanagement that came to light
in 2001, such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco.2  These scandals
cost shareholders and employees billions of dollars and eroded public confidence in
large corporations, securities markets, and corporate governance in general.3
Employees of these companies were aware of fraud within their companies, but
either failed to come forward because of fear of retaliation or because senior man-
agement ignored their warnings.4  In order to encourage the reporting of such
fraud in the future, Congress enacted Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley,5 which
protects employees against retaliation by employers for reporting alleged viola-
tions occurring within public companies.  Employees are protected regardless of
whether they attempt to first report alleged misconduct within the company so
long as they reasonably believe in the existence of a violation.6
This note contends that Section 806 fails to properly balance the counter-
vailing and often competing interests of employees, employers, and the public by
allowing employees to report perceived violations outside of the company without
first attempting to utilize internal channels of communication.  The impact of
publicity regarding potential corporate misconduct can be devastating to public
companies, especially in cases where such misconduct could have been handled
within the organization.7  The goal of whistleblower protection under Sarbanes-
Oxley should be to correct wrongdoing as quickly and efficiently as possible.  In
many cases, the most effective method of correcting corporate misconduct is by
1. The whistleblower provision of Sarbanes-Oxley is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).
2. Robert G. Vaughn, America’s First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate Whistleblowers,
57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); see  Miriam Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH.
L. REV. 1029, 1035–43 (2004) (discussing and analyzing two well-known whistleblowers, Sherron Wat-
kins at Enron and Cynthia Cooper at WorldCom).  The public attention on individuals at large companies
who reported wrongdoing is illustrated by the fact that TIME Magazine named three whistleblowers
“Persons of the Year” in 2002: Coleen Rowley of the FBI, Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, and Sherron
Watkins of Enron. See  Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002,
at 32.
3. Vaughn, supra note 2, at 2.
4. See id. In the case of Enron, it was reported that on at least one occasion the company investigated
whether it could take some employment action against an employee who raised such concerns.  The Senate
Judiciary Committee reported that examples such as Enron exposed a culture of “corporate silence” that
created an atmosphere where corporate wrongdoing could readily occur.  “The consequences of this corpo-
rate code of silence to investors in publicly traded companies, in particular, and for the stock market in
general, are serious and adverse, and they must be remedied.” S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002).
5. Section 806 is titled, “Protection For Employees of Publicly Traded Companies Who Provide Evidence of
Fraud.” See  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004)).
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (protecting employees who provide information, or cause information to be
provided, of conduct that the employee reasonably believes constitutes a fraud).
7. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the In-
terests of the Employee, the Organization, and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 300 (1991).
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reporting violations internally to supervisors or senior managers who may be
unaware of problems within the company.8  While employees are often the most
effective watchdogs within a company, employers are often in the best position to
correct problems.
This note proposes that Congress amend Section 806 to encourage internal
whistleblowing by requiring employees to pursue internal reporting unless the
employee has a reasonable belief that the employer would not make a good faith
effort to address the problem.  This would promote internal reporting while still
permitting external reporting where it would be impracticable for employees to
communicate through internal channels.  Such an amendment to Section 806
would maximize the positive aspects of whistleblowing while minimizing its po-
tential harmful effects on employers.
Part II of this note will examine the history and development of
whistleblower law from the employment-at-will doctrine to the various forms of
protection available to employees who report alleged wrongdoing in the work-
place.  It will also discuss the distinction between internal and external
whistleblowing and the reasons for encouraging employees to report alleged vio-
lations within their organization in most circumstances.  Part III will examine
whistleblower protection under Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley as well as the
current statutory scheme, which favors the interests of employees over employers
and may prove to be unduly harmful to employers.  Finally, Part IV will propose
that Section 806 be amended to require that employees pursue internal channels
of communication unless they have a reasonable belief that such action will not
prompt a good faith remedial effort by the employer.
II. THE PATH FROM EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION
Loyalty is a value cherished in all aspects of human relationships—from
family and friends to the workplace.9  In the workplace, employees owe a fiduci-
ary duty to their employers, requiring them to act primarily for the benefit of
their employers in matters connected to their employment.10  In the course of em-
ployment, duties of loyalty to the employer must often be balanced with civic
duties, individual rights, and other loyalties outside the workplace.11  Whistle-
8. Id.
9. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF RETALIATORY DIS-
CHARGE 1 (2d ed. 2004).
10. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958) (“Among the agent’s fiduciary duties
to the principal is the duty to account for profits arising out of the employment; the duty not to act as, or on
account of, an adverse party without the principal’s consent; the duty not to compete with the principal on
his own account or for another in matters relating to the subject matter of the agency; and the duty to deal
fairly with the principal in all transactions between them.”)).
11. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 1–2.  The author describes instances where competing duties of
loyalty and honesty outside of the workplace require the employee to act in ways that may be adverse to the
employer.  In cases where, for example, the employee is asked to violate a law in order to keep her job, that
639
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blowing laws are an attempt to balance the competing duties of loyalty that em-
ployees may face in the workplace.12  The law of whistleblowing has expanded
significantly from the employment-at-will doctrine, which afforded employees
little protection, to the myriad of legal protections available today.
A. Employment-at-Will Doctrine and Public Policy Exceptions
While there is no single definition of whistleblowing, this note will define
whistleblowing as “an attempt by an employee of a corporation or business firm
to disclose what he or she believes to be wrongdoing in or by the organization.”13
Whistleblower laws have evolved to mitigate the harsh impact of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine, which allows the employer to discharge the employee for
any reason and also allows the employee to leave for any reason unless there is an
express agreement to the contrary.14  The employment-at-will doctrine permits
employers to “dismiss their employe[e]s at will, be they many or few, for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty
of legal wrong.”15  A strict application of this doctrine would allow an employer
to terminate a whistleblower without facing any liability even if the discharge
was purely for retaliatory purposes.16  This doctrine was applied toward the end
of the nineteenth century to protect freedom of industrial expansion and en-
courage economic growth during the Industrial Revolution under the theory that
employee clearly deserves legal protection for choosing not to participate.  This note will focus on situations
where there is a delicate balance between competing loyalties and it is not clear that the employee should
be protected for engaging in action that may be harmful to the employer.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: A Com-
parative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 543, 548 (2004) (“[One possible
origin of the term “whistleblowing” derives from] the act of an English bobby blowing his whistle upon
becoming aware of the commission of a crime to alert other law enforcement officers and the public within
the zone of danger.”) (citing Dahl v. Combined Ins. Co., 621 N.W.2d 163, 167 (S.D. 2001)).
14. Julie Jones, Give a Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad Interpretation of the Whistleblower
Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1137–38 (2003).
Jones traces the development of the employment-at-will doctrine in the United States from the time of
America’s separation from Great Britain.  The English common law rule deemed employment to be one
year in length unless the parties had specified a different length of employment. Id. at 1142.
15. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519–20 (1884), overruled on other grounds by Hutton v.
Watters, 132 Tenn. 527 (1915).  In Payne, the court held that a railroad may establish a policy whereby
an employee can be discharged from employment if he traded with a particular businessman.  In distin-
guishing between acts that are wrong and those that are illegal and therefore actionable, the court stated:
“The great and rich and powerful are guaranteed the same liberty and privilege as the poor and weak.
All may buy and sell when they choose; they may refuse to employ or dismiss whom they choose, without
being thereby guilty of a legal wrong, though it may seriously injure and even ruin others.” Payne, 81
Tenn. at 519.
16. Jones, supra note 14, at 1137–38.
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greater employer freedom in hiring and firing would help guard against business
failure.17
The focus on providing legal protections to employers began to shift in the
1960s with increasing public concern for individual rights and quality of life.18
Courts and legislatures began carving out exceptions to the general employment-
at-will doctrine.  One such exception, rooted in public policy concerns, became the
foundation for future laws protecting terminated whistleblowers.19  The public
policy exception allows an employee to assert a cause of action against the em-
ployer for wrongful discharge if the court finds that the termination violates pub-
lic policy.20  While exceptions to the traditional doctrine have grown, it remains
the default rule in all states other than Montana.21  Even in states that do not
provide statutory protection for whistleblowers, many “recognize some form of
judicially created public policy exception.”22  Specifically, many state laws recog-
nize whistleblowing as “one type of public policy exception to [the] employment-
at-will” doctrine.23
B. The Internal Versus External Reporting Distinction
Whistleblowing generally implicates three distinct and often contradictory
concerns: the employee, the organization, and society in general.24  The employee
has an interest in reporting wrongdoing without being penalized.25  Depending
on the motivations of the particular employee in reporting wrongdoing, the em-
ployee often has an interest in seeing that the violation is corrected in a timely
fashion.26  The employer, on the other hand, has an interest in maximizing con-
17. Id. at 1143. Likewise, employees favored this freedom of contract as businesses became less dependent on
the seasons and employees felt they should not necessarily be required to work all four seasons as would be
required under English common law. Id .
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1143–45.
20. Id. at 1144.  This doctrine was developed in Petermann v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), in which an employee was terminated for refusing to falsely testify to a
legislative committee at the request of his employer.  The court stated that in order to promote the public
policy against perjury the court must “deny the employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an
employee whose employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is the em-
ployee’s refusal to commit perjury.” Id. at 400.
21. Montana has adopted a for-cause wrongful discharge statute that requires an employer to show “good
cause” for termination. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904 (2007).
22. Cherry, supra note 2, at 1045.
23. Jones, supra note 14, at 1147.
24. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 7, at 268.
25. Id .
26. Much social-psychological research indicates that, in general, whistleblowers are loyal workers who truly
seek to promote change within the organization.  The typical case involves an employee who has been
working in the organization for some time and who has a genuine desire to ensure that the organization
corrects any wrongdoing. See  Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing
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trol and efficiency, minimizing any possible legal and administrative costs, and
preventing negative publicity likely to result from public disclosure of negative
information.27  Additionally, the employer has an interest in maintaining loyalty
and discipline within the organization and protecting confidential information.28
Lastly, society has an interest in encouraging lawful behavior and ensuring that
those responsible for wrongdoing are held accountable for their actions.29  Balanc-
ing these interests is crucial in the development of any whistleblower law that
promotes the goal of correcting wrongdoing at the least expense to all three
concerns.30
There is an important distinction between reporting perceived violations
within the organization and reporting perceived violations outside of the organi-
zation to external regulatory agencies, Congress, the media, or other public out-
lets.31  Reporting within the organization can provide the employer with an
opportunity to correct violations before they become public and potentially harm
the organization, requiring significant expenditures for external investigations.32
Internal reporting is also consistent with the employee’s fiduciary duty to his em-
ployer and preserves confidentiality.33  External reporting, on the other hand,
may be necessary if it is likely the employer is aware or complicit in the violation
and, therefore, unlikely to take appropriate measures to address the
whistleblower’s concern.
C. Federal and State Whistleblower Laws: Contrasting Goals and
Application
Whistleblowing law, in large part, has been left to the discretion of individ-
ual states.  The result is that across the country whistleblower laws vary signifi-
cantly in the scope of protection afforded to employees.34  State law protections
and Corporate Governance: Promoting Organizational Effectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and
Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 195 (2002).
27. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 7, at 268.
28. Cavico, supra note 13, at 643.
29. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 7, at 268.
30. Id.
31. Because Section 806 of Sarbanes-Oxley does not include protection for reporting to the media, a discussion
of the implications of such reporting is beyond the scope of this note.  For an examination of disclosure to
the media, see Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the
Media: When is a “Source” a “Sourcerer”?, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 357, 364 (1993).
32. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 7, at 300.
33. See Eletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K. and U.S. Approaches to Dis-
closure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT’L. L. 879, 890–91 (2004); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1958) (“[An implied duty of confidentiality requires an employee] not to use or to
communicate information confidentially given him by the principal . . . to the injury of the principal . . .
unless the information is a matter of general knowledge.”).  Comment f allows disclosure of information
where the employer has committed or is about to commit a crime. Id. § 395 cmt. f.
34. Cherry, supra note 2, at 1033.
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developed to protect private employees who reported illegal activity by an em-
ployer or who were terminated for refusing to participate in illegal activity.35
Most of these laws provide “a general private cause of action for employees who
report[ed] violations.”36  Today, every state recognizes some form of protection for
whistleblowing, but they vary widely in the scope of protection offered and judi-
cial opinions differ in their interpretations of such statutes.37  Each state
whistleblower statute contains an anti-retaliation provision, but beyond this
similarity what remains is a divergent scope of laws.38
Most states offer general whistleblower protection to public employees, while
a minority of states provide the same protection to all workers.39  This reflects the
traditional view that a violation must implicate a “public interest” in order to be
actionable.40  State whistleblower laws differ on many points including the ap-
propriate recipient of the whistleblower report, the subject of protected
whistleblowing, the motive of the whistleblower, the required quality of evidence
of wrongdoing, and the remedies available for the whistleblower.41  New York is
on one end of the spectrum of employee protection, providing very limited protec-
tion for whistleblowers and requiring that the violation present a “substantial
and specific danger to the public health or safety . . . .”42  New Hampshire is on
the other end of the spectrum, providing protection where the employee has a
reasonable belief that the employer is engaged in a violation of any state law.43
Between these extremes lie state whistleblower laws that take varying ap-
proaches to protecting employees who report alleged violations.
35. See Trystan Phifer O’Leary, Note, Silencing the Whistleblower: The Gap Between Federal and
State Retaliatory Discharge Laws, 85 IOWA L. REV. 663, 664 (2000).
36. Id.
37. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower Protection,
38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000).
38. Id. at 107–08.
39. Id . at 111.
40. WESTMAN & MOFESITT, supra note 9, at 41–42.
41. See  Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 37, at 107–08.
42. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2006).  Section 740(2) states:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because
such employee does any of the following:
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy, or
practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation
creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety, or
which constitutes health care fraud;
(b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body conducting an investigation,
hearing or inquiry into any such violation of a law, rule or regulation by such employer;
or
(c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, policy or practice in violation of
a law, rule or regulation.
Id. § 740(2) (emphasis added).
43. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2007).  The statute provides, in relevant part:
643
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Initially, protection against retaliatory discharge at the federal level was
only provided if the specific statute violated by the employer contained an anti-
retaliation provision.44  This reflected the legislative choice that certain viola-
tions were sufficiently important to justify protecting employees who blew the
whistle.45  Many federal laws were originally developed with the goal of protect-
ing the public at large by enforcing specific statutes that often related to matters
of public health and safety.46  As a result, many such laws were designed with the
ultimate goal of protecting the public and not the individual employee who re-
ported the alleged violation.47  The anti-retaliatory provisions that accompany
many federal statutes can be viewed as aiding in the enforcement of those statutes
by encouraging employees to come forward and report violations by their
employer.48
Throughout the twentieth century to the present day, business organizations
have been subject to various federal regulations prohibiting certain business prac-
tices and making the violation of such regulations a crime.49  During the 1980s,
there was an increase in instances of whistleblowing as public confidence in the
government’s ability to prevent illegal business practices eroded.50  There was a
general trend toward deregulation and an increased reliance on the ability of
No employer shall discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against any employee re-
garding such employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employ-
ment because:
(a) The employee, in good faith, reports or causes to be reported, verbally or in writing,
what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of any law or rule
adopted under the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United
States; or
(b) The employee, in good faith, participates, verbally or in writing, in an investigation,
hearing, or inquiry conducted by any governmental entity, including a court action,
which concerns allegations that the employer has violated any law or rule adopted
under the laws of this state, a political subdivision of this state, or the United States.
Id. (emphasis added).
44. See Cherry, supra note 2, at 1049–50.
45. O’Leary, supra note 35, at 663–64.
46. See id. at 666–67.  O’Leary argues that the ultimate goal of protecting the public welfare is reflected by
the fact that many federal whistleblower laws provide procedures for punishing violations of the statute
without granting the employee any private remedies.  Some examples of such acts include: Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1)–(2) (2000); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(a) (2000); Employment Retirement Investment Securities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000); Family
and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (2000); Federal Surface Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293(b)
(2000).  On the other hand some federal whistleblower statutes do offer a private remedy to employees
including: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, 12 U.S.C § 1831j(b) (2000) and
Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C § 5851(b) (1995).
47. O’Leary, supra note 35, at 666–67.
48. Cherry, supra note 2, at 1049.
49. WESTMAN & MODESSIT, supra note 9, at 10.
50. Id. at 11.
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private citizens, rather than the government, to prevent misconduct.51  The
move toward increased deregulation of the industry reflected the view that gov-
ernment was not in the position to effectively remedy certain social ills.52  This
coincided with increased legal protection for whistleblowers, who were viewed as
more adept at detecting and protecting against corruption and other business
fraud.53
The deregulation trend came to an end after the now all too familiar series
of corporate scandals beginning in 2001, when accounting fraud and other busi-
ness abuses became public.54  Congress responded to the public call for change by
passing Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002.55  Among the many reforms of Sarbanes-Oxley
is a federal whistleblower statute that provides protection for employees from
retaliatory discharge based on the theory that protecting whistleblowers will en-
courage disclosures of violations and prevent harm to shareholders, employees,
and society.56
III. SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 806
A. Change in Focus of Regulation
  Before Sarbanes-Oxley, regulation and prevention of financial fraud was
largely left to private agencies charged with overseeing particular industries.57
This system of oversight relied primarily on outside agencies.  These agencies
were generally removed from the operations of the business, making it difficult to
detect fraud in a timely fashion.58  Outside public accounting firms were respon-
sible for auditing the financial statements of issuers in the hopes that they would
uncover any financial fraud before it affected the public.59  Additionally, the in-
ternal audit committees of boards of directors reviewed the financial statements
of their companies to detect inaccuracies before reporting information to the pub-
lic.60  This system of oversight was insufficient to guard against the abuses of
senior management that cost employees and shareholders significant financial




54. Vaughn, supra note 2, at 2.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 18–19.  For example the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) regulated public securities markets and had enforcement powers that gave it the power to seek
penalties against issuers who misled the public. Id. at 18.
58. See id. at 19.
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Sarbanes-Oxley drastically altered the regulation of public companies and, in
particular, increased the protections available for employees who report alleged
wrongdoing either within their companies or to the public.62
Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, most federal and state whistleblower laws only
protected private sector employees whose reports of wrongdoing involved matters
of public health or safety.63  Financial fraud was not protected because at the
time it was not considered a matter of public concern.64  Government employees,
however, received protection for reporting financial fraud because misuse of gov-
ernment funds meant that taxpayer funds were being wasted, and this was a
matter of public concern.65  With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress indi-
cated that fraud against shareholders is an issue of public concern deserving of
protection.66  The drastic increase in the size and complexity of businesses along
with rapidly advancing technology has made it more difficult to prevent, un-
cover, and correct wrongdoing that can have a severe impact on companies, em-
ployees, and the public at large.67  Whistleblowing has come to be viewed as a
necessary device to empower those individuals who are most likely to understand
and detect fraud that may otherwise go unnoticed.68
B. Federal Protection for Whistleblowers in Public Companies
Recognizing the need for federalized whistleblower protection in corporate
America, Congress provided for a civil action to protect against retaliation in
fraud cases.69  The anti-retaliation provision applies to companies whose securi-
ties are registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
“Exchange Act”) or companies that are required to file reports under Section 15(d)
of the Exchange Act.70  Employers may not “demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or
in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and condi-
62. Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Accounting Company Oversight Board to ensure that outside auditors
perform appropriately and to ensure that they do not engage in activities likely to create conflicts of
interest.
63. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 156–57.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 157.
66. Id.
67. Callahan, supra note 33, at 881–82.
68. Id. at 881.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).  Sarbanes-Oxley also includes protection against retaliatory dis-
charge in the form of criminal penalties against employers who engage in such activity.  Section 1107 of
Sarbanes-Oxley provides for criminal fines or imprisonment up to ten years for anyone who, with the
intent to retaliate, takes “any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful em-
ployment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information
relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense . . . .” Id. § 1513(e).
70. Id. § 1514A(a).
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tions of employment” for engaging in any protected activity under the statute.71
Employees are protected if they “provide information, cause information to be
provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation . . . [of securities laws] . . . or
any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.”72  Employ-
ees may provide such information to federal regulatory or law enforcement agen-
cies, any member or committee of Congress, or any person with supervisory
authority over the employee or the authority to investigate misconduct.73  Em-
ployees are also protected if they “file, cause to be filed, testify, participate in, or
otherwise assist in a proceeding filed or about to be filed . . . relating to an alleged
violation . . . [of securities laws] . . . or any provision of federal law relating to
fraud against shareholders.74
While many other whistleblower provisions require an actual violation to
have occurred in order for an employee to state a valid claim,75 Sarbanes-Oxley
only requires that an employee reasonably believe the employer was engaging in
conduct that violated federal securities laws.76  In a statement of legislative pur-
pose, Senator Patrick Leahy reported that Sarbanes-Oxley is designed to include
all “good faith and reasonable reporting of fraud, and there should be no pre-
sumption that reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence.”77  Sarbanes-
Oxley was designed to impose the general reasonable person standard used in a
variety of other contexts.78  As such, the employee’s particular experience, back-
ground, and access to information will be taken into account in the analysis of
whether that employee had a reasonable belief of a securities violation.79  The
reasonable belief requirement ensures that employees who may not have specific
training or knowledge of the relevant complex securities laws can still be pro-
tected.80  Additionally, there is no requirement that the alleged violations be ma-
71. Id.
72. Id. § 1514A(a)(1).
73. Id. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(C).
74. Id. § 1514A(a)(2).
75. For example, the New York Labor Law prohibits retaliatory action against an employee where the em-
ployee discloses or threatens to disclose a practice that “is  in violation of law.” N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a)
(McKinney 2006) (emphasis added).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1).
77. 148 CONG. REC. S7418, 7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
78. See generally Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993).
79. Vaughn, supra note 2, at 16.
80. See id.  The justifications for the reasonable belief test were discussed by the United States Merit Systems
Protection Board in their interpretation of the Whistleblower Protection Act:
[W]e cannot add requirements not found in the statute, such as a full investigation by the
whistleblower before making a disclosure . . . .  Congress intended to protect even partial
disclosures, provided the information disclosed is sufficient to support a reasonable belief of
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terial to the company or shareholders so long as the employee possesses the
requisite reasonable belief of a violation.81
Section 806 provides for an administrative procedure to handle complaints
of retaliatory discharge that is conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (“OSHA”).82 A covered employee must file a complaint with the
secretary of labor within ninety days of the alleged discrimination.83  The secre-
tary has authority to conduct an investigation if the complainant “has made a
prima facie showing that the alleged protected activity was a contributing factor”
in the alleged retaliatory action.84   The defendant then has the opportunity to
show, by “clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken the same un-
favorable personnel action in the absence of the protected activity.”85  If the de-
fendant fails to meet this burden and the secretary finds there is reasonable cause
to believe that discriminatory behavior has occurred, the secretary will issue a
preliminary order providing appropriate relief.86  After the preliminary order is
wrongdoing, despite the possibility that examination of all the facts would reveal that the
actions were not improper.
Id. at 16 n.45 (citing Spears, 75 M.S.P.R. 639, 660 (1997)).
81. Henrich, 2004-SOX-51 (ALJ Nov. 23, 2004), 2004 DOLSOX LEXIS 83, *17–21 (holding that an em-
ployee is not required to show the materiality of an employer’s alleged violation of law).
82. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1980 (2007).
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.103.  The limitations period commences once the employee is aware or reasonably should
be aware of the employer’s decision.  Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. UPS, 249 F.3d 557,
562 (6th Cir. 2001).
84. See  Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,860, at 31,861 (May 28, 2003) (codified at
29 C.F.R. pt. 1980).  In order to state a prima facie case an employee must show that: (1) she engaged in
protected activity, (2) the named person had actual or constructive knowledge that the employee engaged
in the protected activity, (3) the employee suffered unfavorable personnel action, and (4) the protected
activity is shown to have been a contributing factor in the unfavorable action.  29 C.F.R.
§ 1980.104(b)(1).  Generally a prima facie case is established if the complaint shows that the adverse
personnel action took place shortly after the protected activity. Id.  Courts and administrative agencies
have concluded that to prove a disclosure was a contributing factor to the retaliatory action the employee
need only demonstrate that “the fact of, or the content of, the protected disclosure was one of the factors that
tended to affect in any way the personnel action.”  Marano v. Dep’t of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1143 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
85. See  Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. at 31,861.
86. Id. at 31,861.  The preliminary relief may include all relief necessary:
[T]o make the employee whole, including, where appropriate: reinstatement with the same
seniority status that the employee would have had but for the discrimination; back pay with
interest; and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the discrimina-
tion, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees.
29 C.F.R. § 1980.105(a)(1).  Reinstatement is the presumptive remedy under Section 806.  In Welch v.
Cardinal Bankshares Corp., a former chief financial officer was reinstated despite difficulties such as
hostility and distrust among the rest of management.  Welch, 2003-SOX-15  (ALJ Feb. 15, 2005), 2005
DOLSOX LEXIS 8.
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issued both parties will have thirty days to file objections and request a hearing
before an administrative law judge or else the preliminary order becomes final.87
If a hearing is held, the secretary then has one hundred twenty days to either
provide for appropriate relief or deny the complaint.88  After issuance of this final
order, any person aggrieved by the order may file an appeal with the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the circuit in which the violation occurred or where the complain-
ant resided on the date of the violation.89  If the secretary has not issued a final
decision within one hundred eighty days of the filing of the complaint, the com-
plainant may seek a de novo hearing in Federal District Court.90
C. Inadequate Balancing of Interests
Although Section 806 does not go so far as to permit reporting directly to the
media, the external channels that it does allow could become public news and
have a dramatic effect on investor confidence in public companies.91  Section 806
allows an employee, as a first resort, to report a broad range of alleged violations
to a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency or any member or committee of
Congress.92  Information disclosed to federal or law enforcement agencies or to
Congress has the potential to become widely disseminated.93  Federal agencies
may release information to the public at their discretion and such information can
often be released without fear of liability.94  Members or committees of Congress
may release information to the media or members of the public and as a result
such information may be disclosed beyond the parties identified in Section 806.95
The provision assumes that Congress and other public bodies will consider the
public interest in disclosure and weigh that against the possible risks of disclosing
information outside of the company.96  Even where Congress or another public
body does determine that disclosure is in the best interests of the public, cases may
arise where mistaken beliefs about wrongdoing become public and negatively im-
87. Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and
Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, 29 C.F.R. § 1980.106.  If an objection is timely filed, any
order of preliminary reinstatement will take effect, but the remaining remedies will not take effect until
the administrative proceedings are completed. Id.
88. 29 C.F.R. § 1980.110(c).
89. Id. § 1980.112(a).
90. Id. § 1980.114(a).
91. Vaughn, supra note 2, at 58.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(A)–(B) (Supp. IV 2004).
93. Vaughn, supra note 2, at 57.
94. Id. at 57–58.
95. Id. at 58.
96. Id .
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pact the company.97  Internal reporting of alleged violations would provide a
more effective method of vetting such concerns prior to permitting external
disclosure.98
From the employer’s perspective, the goal is to minimize the negative conse-
quences of whistleblowing while harnessing its potential benefits.99
Whistleblowing has the greatest potential for good where wrongdoing is first re-
ported within the organization because it gives the employer the opportunity to
correct the problem or at least mitigate the damages.100  Where the employer does
take remedial measures, internal reporting prevents negative publicity, investi-
gations, and legal actions.101  Perceived misconduct within the organization may
result from an employee’s erroneous evaluation of an employer’s actions or from a
disagreement about ethical standards rather than a clear violation.102  In a case
where no actual wrongdoing occurred, internal whistleblowing would allow the
employer to clarify the misunderstanding before negative information becomes
public.103
Support for internal whistleblowing has been found in a rather unlikely
source, Cynthia Cooper of WorldCom, who reported “her discovery . . . of ac-
counting fraud to the board of directors’ audit committee.”104  The board fired the
chief financial officer, who was responsible for the conduct, and ultimately dis-
closed the matter to the public.105 Although news of the fraud at the company
eventually made front-page headlines,106 WorldCom was given the opportunity
to correct the inappropriate conduct.  Cooper stated in an interview that there
“was only one right path to take” and advised other potential whistleblowers to
take concerns to the appropriate company officer before reporting the matter ex-
ternally.107  Even where information of wrongdoing eventually becomes public,
companies can often benefit from voluntarily disclosing such information in coop-
eration with the government.108
97. Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 AM.
BUS. L.J. 241, 243 (1987).
98. The counterargument here is that fear of disclosure might be a motivation for companies not to engage in
wrongdoing in the first place.  This argument, however, does not address the concerns about the negative
effects of external disclosure in cases where an employee mistakenly perceives wrongdoing.
99. Dworkin & Near, supra note 97, at 242.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 243.
103. Id.
104. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 40.
105. Id.
106. Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 2, at 44.
107. Michael Barrier, One Right Path: Cynthia Cooper, INTERNAL AUDITOR, Dec. 1, 2003, at 52.
108. See infra Part IV.
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The primary goal of Section 806 should be to encourage the early recognition
and correction of wrongdoing, rather than to punish the wrongdoers them-
selves.109  Though the individuals responsible for corporate wrongdoing should be
held accountable for their actions, it is important not to punish an entire com-
pany, as well as its shareholders, where the violation may in fact be the result of
a rogue employee and not representative of the company at large.  Where feasible,
the employer should be presented with the opportunity to correct problems or
misunderstandings internally before negative information becomes public.  Such
public dissemination of information presents the added problem of shareholder
harm because of the possibility of decreased share value.110
IV. AMENDING SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 806 TO ENCOURAGE INTERNAL
WHISTLEBLOWING
A. Finding the Proper Balance Between Competing Interests
An appropriate balance to the competing and sometimes divergent interests
of employee, employer, and the public would be to design whistleblowing statutes
to encourage internal reporting of perceived violations while preserving outlets
for external reporting in certain situations.  Therefore, Section 806 should be
amended to require, as a default rule, internal reporting of violations and to
allow external reporting under specified conditions.  External reporting should be
permitted in the first instance only where the employee (1) has a reasonable belief
that the employer will not make a prompt good faith effort to address the prob-
lem,111 (2) reasonably believes an emergency is involved, or (3) reasonably fears
reprisal or retaliatory action as a result of disclosure.112  This requirement would
still place the burden on the employer to develop an effective reporting procedure
within the organization.  Where there are insufficient procedures for reporting
violations internally and the employee has a reasonable belief that the problems
would not be addressed, the employee would be permitted to report the problems
109. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 7, at 285.  Dworkin argues that “[a]lthough prosecution may be a
legitimate secondary goal of public whistleblower protection, it should not be permitted to hamper the
primary objective of most whistleblowing statutes, which is to correct the wrongdoing as quickly and
efficiently as possible.” Id.  Even though this article was written in 1991, the same analysis should apply
today to Section 806 as well as to similar whistleblower laws.
110. For a discussion of the economic theories behind the integration of information into the price of stock, see
generally Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA.
L. REV. 549, 549–66 (1983).
111. This could occur, for example, where the employee reasonably believes that supervisors or those individuals
who would ordinarily be responsible for handling the alleged violation already know the activity or policy
in question.
112. There are several states that require internal whistleblowing as a first resort and all vary in the exact
wording of the statutes.  The general exceptions allowed for external reporting involve emergencies, fear
of reprisal, and reasonable belief that reporting internally would not result in reasonable employer action
to address the matter. See infra Part IV.B.3.
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externally.  By adopting this rule, Section 806 will come closer to the ultimate
goal of correcting wrongdoing in the most efficient manner while balancing the
interests of the parties involved.
Requiring internal reporting as a first resort to correct potential wrongdo-
ing would allow the management of responsible organizations an opportunity to
correct any problems before they become public.  Additionally, despite the current
negative public perception of large corporations and senior executives resulting
from several relatively recent public scandals, it is reasonable to believe employers
covered under Section 806 are not always aware of violations occurring within
their company.  Requiring employees to initially make reports within their orga-
nizations would help to alert employers who might not have knowledge that
wrongdoing is occurring within the organization.  Where there is no evidence of
intentional wrongdoing, employees should be encouraged to report their concerns
within the organization to give managers the chance to correct problems that
may in fact have been caused by negligence, oversight, mistake, or some other
problem capable of internal remedy.113  Requiring internal disclosure as a first
resort would also encourage organizations to develop effective reporting and
compliance mechanisms to ensure that problems are corrected within the organi-
zation in order to avoid external disclosure.114
B. Support for Internal Whistleblowing
There has been a relatively recent trend toward encouraging internal
whistleblowing, reflected by the establishment of internal whistleblowing proce-
dures and state laws requiring employees to first pursue internal channels of re-
porting, where feasible, before reporting information externally.115  Both the
courts and legislatures have directly and indirectly promoted the establishment of
such procedures.116
1. Corporate Sentencing Guidelines
One significant congressional recognition of the importance of internal
whistleblowing are the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, which offer financial
incentives to organizations to implement effective compliance and ethics pro-
grams to prevent and detect violations of law.117  The guidelines work by as-
113. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 9, at 39–40.
114. Dworkin & Near, supra note 97, at 251.
115. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNCS, and Peace, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 457,
462–63 (2002) (arguing that this trend toward internal whistleblowing reflects a decreased reliance on
the government to punish violations and an increased focus on early detection and reporting in order to
deter and correct wrongdoing).
116. Id. at 463.
117. JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
§ 4:1 (2006).
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signing “culpability scores” to defendant corporations that can be reduced by
maintaining an effective program of prevention and detection, and also by dis-
closing their misconduct to the appropriate governmental authorities and cooper-
ating in government investigations.118  The court may reduce sentences for
mitigating factors such as substantial assistance to authorities.119
The guidelines determine penalties for corporations convicted of federal
crimes and offer reduced penalties for organizations that have implemented pro-
grams designed to detect and deter misconduct.120  Characteristics of an effective
system include a code of ethics, a workable reporting system, and protection for
whistleblowers from retaliation.121  One requirement for an effective program
relates specifically to internal reporting of violations and requires that the organ-
ization “[has] and publicize[s] a system that may include mechanisms for report-
ing that allow for anonymity or confidentiality.”122  The guidelines offer the
incentives of decreased penalties and avoidance of negative publicity for those
organizations that make a good faith effort to implement effective procedures of
internal compliance.123
2. Supreme Court Recognition of Internal Whistleblowing
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently recognized the importance of internal
whistleblowing in the context of sexual discrimination claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton124 and Bur-
lington Industries v. Ellerth.125  In these cases, decided on the same day, the
Supreme Court provided guidance on how best to deal with complaints stemming
from instances of sexual harassment in the workplace.  The decisions provide an
affirmative defense to liability under Title VII for employers if they take reason-
able care to prevent and promptly stop harassment from occurring once it has
been reported.126  Employers can also be shielded from liability by showing that
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. See  Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Mischief Afoot: The Need for Incentives to
Control Corporate Criminal Conduct, 71 B.U. L. REV. 447, 452–53 (1991) (arguing that all penalties
against the corporation should be eliminated where “an employee violates the company’s compliance
programs”).
121. Dworkin, supra note 115, at 464.  Dworkin discusses the “carrot and stick” approach taken by the guide-
lines whereby convicted organizations that have not made an effort to curb wrongdoing suffer the “stick”
of increased penalties, sanctions, and receive negative publicity.  Organizations that have made a good
faith effort to implement effective procedures, on the other hand, receive the “carrot” of decreased penalties.
Id.
122. 18 U.S.C. app. § 8B2.1 (Supp. IV 2004).
123. Dworkin, supra note 115, at 464.
124. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
125. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
126. Id. at 765.
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they have policies in place that are designed to prevent such harassment from
occurring in the first place.127  The employer can raise a defense on the grounds
that the employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”128
In Faragher, the Court discussed the rationale for providing such an af-
firmative defense and the competing interests involved.129  The Court began by
stating that allowing the employer to defend itself where the employee failed to
take advantage of available internal opportunities for corrective action reflects
“an equally obvious policy imported from the general theory of damages, that a
victim has a duty to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to
avoid or minimize the damages.”130  The Court reasoned that where the plaintiff
unreasonably fails to avail herself of available remedial measures, she should not
recover damages that could have been avoided if she had done so.131
3. State Laws Encouraging Internal Whistleblowing
Support for internal whistleblowing is currently found in a clear minority of
states, where whistleblowing within the organization is required prior to report-
ing the alleged violation outside of the organization.132  Although these statutes
differ in the scope of protection they offer to employees, they all reflect the policy
that the employee give the allegedly wrongdoing employer an opportunity to cor-
rect the activity or policy at issue.133  Certain states require internal reporting as
a first resort, whereas others include exceptions to the rule that generally allow
for external reporting where the employee has a reasonable belief that an internal
report would prove futile.134
For example, Ohio requires the employee to disclose alleged violations inter-
nally before reporting them outside of the company.135  The statute requires em-
ployers to correct the violation or make a reasonable and good faith effort to do so
within twenty-four hours after receiving a written report from the employee.136
If the employer does not take corrective action within the twenty-four hour pe-
riod, the employee may then disclose the violations externally to a public official
127. See id.  This affirmative defense is not available when the supervisor’s harassment results in “tangible
employment action” such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment. Id.
128. Id.
129. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
130. Id. at 806–07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. Id.
132. See infra Part V.
133. See infra Part V.
134. See infra Part V.
135. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (West 2006).
136. Id. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a).
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or agency with supervisory authority over the employer.137  Florida requires that
the employee give the employer a reasonable opportunity to correct the problem
before the employee may report externally.138  New York, which provides very
limited protection to whistleblowers,139 requires the employee to bring the activ-
ity or violation to the attention to the employer and afford the employer a reason-
able opportunity to correct before making any external disclosures.140
Other states include similar internal reporting requirements, but carve out
exceptions in certain instances where internal reporting would be impossible or
unlikely to prove effective.  Maine requires an employee to report alleged viola-
tions to someone with supervisory authority and give the employer a reasonable
opportunity to correct the problem.141  However, internal reporting is not re-
quired if the employee has specific reason to believe that reports to the employer
will not result in prompt corrective action.142  Indiana requires the employee to
report alleged violations to the employer, unless the employer is the person whom
the employee believes is committing the violation.143  New Jersey requires the
employee to disclose the conduct in writing to a supervisor and includes an excep-
tion to the internal reporting requirement where the employee is: (1) reasonably
certain that the activity is known to one or more supervisors of the employer, or
(2) reasonably fears physical harm as a result of the disclosure, provided that the
situation is emergency in nature.144  New Hampshire’s whistleblower statute
provides that the employee must first report internally unless the employee “has
specific reason to believe that reporting such a violation to his employer would
not result in” prompt remedial measures.145
Alaska has a unique whistleblower statute in that it allows the employer to
determine whether the employee must first make an internal disclosure prior to
reporting suspected violations externally.146  The statute allows the employee to
make disclosures to a public body unless the employer has instituted a written
personnel policy that requires employees to first submit a written report to the
employer.147  If the employer has instituted such a policy, then the employee is
required to make an internal report unless the employee reasonably believes that:
137. Id. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a).
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.102(1) (West 2006).
139. New York only provides protection where the violation creates and presents a substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(2)(a) (McKinney 2006).
140. Id. § 740(3).
141. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 833(2) (2007).
142. Id.
143. IND. CODE § 22-5-3-3(a) (2007).
144. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-4(II) (West 2007).
145. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2 (2007).
146. ALASKA STAT. §  39.90.110(c) (2006).
147. Id.
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(1) the employer will not take prompt action to remedy the problem, (2) the prob-
lem is already known to their supervisor, (3) the situation is emergency in nature,
or (4) the employer will take retaliatory action as a result of disclosure.148
The fact that several states include provisions requiring some form of inter-
nal reporting in their whistleblower statutes reflects the view that internal re-
porting should be encouraged prior to reporting outside the organization where
such reporting is reasonable under the circumstances.  While the states that en-
courage internal reporting do so in various ways, they all reflect the principle
that the proper balance of interests between employee, employer, and society is
found where the employee first reports suspected violations internally in most
circumstances.  This policy gives the employer the opportunity to take remedial
action by giving it a reasonable time to respond before allowing external
disclosures.149
V. CONCLUSION
Whistleblower law has developed over time from the employment-at-will
doctrine to a wide variety of state and federal laws protecting employees from
retaliatory discharge.  Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806 instituted the first federal
protection for employees at public companies from retaliatory discharge for re-
porting violations involving securities laws.  Section 806 allows for civil reme-
dies against employers for retaliatory discharge regardless of whether the
employee makes any attempt to first report alleged violations within the com-
pany.  Despite increasing support for internal whistleblowing demonstrated by
the Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, the U.S. Supreme Court, and a substantial
minority of state laws, Congress failed to include any requirement of internal
reporting in Section 806.  As a result, Congress failed to adequately protect em-
ployers by giving them the opportunity to correct potential mistakes internally
before they are disclosed publicly.  The resulting harm to the employer and its
shareholders from negative publicity should have been addressed by including a
requirement of internal reporting in Section 806.
Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in order to protect investors by requiring in-
creased disclosure from public companies to their shareholders and the public.150
One method of encouraging such disclosure has been the increase in protection
afforded to employees who report suspected wrongdoing on the part of their em-
ployers.  While such protections are undoubtedly necessary in light of recent his-
tory in corporate America, Congress failed to adequately balance the competing
interests of employee and employer in the context of whistleblower protection.
148. Id. § 39.90.110(c)(1)–(4).
149. Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 7, at 278–79.
150. See  Robert Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Mo-
rality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 282 (2005).
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While it is crucial to encourage employees to come forward and report suspected
violations without fear of reprisal, this goal would be better served by requiring
internal disclosure as a first resort in most circumstances.  Congress should there-
fore amend Section 806 to require internal disclosure in most circumstances unless
the employee has a reasonable belief that such disclosure would prove futile.  In
doing so, Congress would be able to better balance the interests of employee and
employer without taking away any protection from shareholders or the public.
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